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HOW DO GERMAN CONTRACTS DO AS MUCH WITH
FEWER WORDS?
CLAIRE A. HILL AND CHRISTOPHER KING*
INTRODUCTION
German business contracts are much shorter than their Ameri-
can counterparts. They also avoid the worst excesses of legalese that
American contracts are known for. But they seem to work as well as
United States contracts. We seek to understand how German busi-
ness contracts could do as much with fewer words.
How well a contract works is not amenable to precise measure-
ment. Still, characterizing German contracts and the business-
contracting endeavor in Germany as working as well as their
American counterparts seems reasonable as a working assumption.
Certainly, there are no indications that Germany's transactional
sector has systematic defects relative to that of the United States.
Transaction activity is vigorous-many deals are negotiated and
consummated. And, as is the case in the United States, some transac-
tions end up being litigated in court, but most do not.
Our explanation is predicated on an account of what contracting
does. Contracting aims to create a bigger transactional pie in a world
where parties' incentives are misaligned and they need to coordinate
* Hill is Professor and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of
Law. King is General Counsel of Hunter Douglas NV. King is admitted as an attorney-at-law in
New York, is on the Roll as a Solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales, and is a
Volljurist in Germany. Hill wishes to acknowledge helpful conversations with Lisa Bernstein,
Margaret Blair, Mary Eaton, Scott Faga, David Gerber, Tom Ginsburg, Steve Harris, Kevin
Haynes, Don Langevoort, David Luban, Clarissa Potter, Mark Rosen, Jackie Ross, Larry Solan,
Micah Thorner, and Richard Warner; helpful research assistance of Deborah Ginsberg; and
helpful comments from participants at the Canadian Law and Economics Association Confer-
ence, the Midwestern Law and Economics Association Conference, the Champaign/Kent Col-
loquium, the Italian-American Congress of Comparative Law conference on Ordinary
Language and Legal Language in Public and Private Law, the Olin Workshop at Georgetown
University Law Center, and the Chicago-Kent Symposium "Law &." where she presented this
paper. King expresses his thanks to his stagiaire Astrid Nelsen for her assistance on researching
some of the issues on German civil procedure as well as the panel of the symposium of the
Deutsch-Amerikanische Juristenvereinigung on Mergers and Acquisitions in September 2003 in
Berlin, Germany, in particular Dr. Martin Schulte of Clifford Chance, Dilsseldorf, where he
discussed some of the issues in this paper.
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the production of information, specify future rights, duties and proce-
dures, and allocate risks. Addressing opportunism resulting from
parties' misalignment of incentives is therefore an enormous part of
the contracting endeavor. Even if the parties' incentives were per-
fectly aligned, they would still need to find out about one another,
and create and define the subject matter of their relationship. But
misaligned incentives add to the volume and urgency of what's
needed: finding out about somebody else is harder if he can benefit
from lying to you. And providing for future contingencies becomes
more important if the other side is willing and able to take advantage
of gaps in the contract to act strategically. Even if we assume a best
case scenario -that each party knows, and knows that the other party
knows, that the biggest pie will result if neither party acts strategi-
cally-the two parties will still expend resources, each to convince the
other that it is not acting strategically, and each to become convinced
that the other is not acting strategically.
The task of contracting thus has both adversarial and non-
adversarial components. The German system permits considerable
economies in the adversarial sphere; the economies extend to the
non-adversarial sphere as well. The economies take the form of a
reduction in transaction costs: transaction documents in Germany are
far less custom-tailored to particular parties and their transaction
than they are in the United States. But why do parties in Germany
apparently think they can achieve their contracting aims with far less
tailoring than is typical in the United States?
Our answer challenges an assumption made in the contracts
literature: that the contracting process in the United States, with its
emphasis on custom tailoring of contracts, sensibly operates to help
parties get precisely the deal they want. If this assumption were accu-
rate, that German parties tailor their contracts less than do their U.S.
counterparts would be puzzling indeed. But we think much customi-
zation in the United States has a far less charitable explanation: it
reflects (a) a costly attempt to constrain opportunism using contract
language, and (b) a failure to create and accept "good enough" solu-
tions to non-adversarial (and some adversarial) issues parties com-
monly face.
We argue that German contracting does better on both these
fronts. It cuts short the costly and inefficient "arms race" in which
U.S. transacting parties and their lawyers too often engage in their
negotiation and drafting of contracts. It also creates and uses "good
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enough" standardized solutions to common non-adversarial (and
some adversarial) problems faced by transacting parties. The solu-
tions are found in the law, in trade association forms, and in law
firms' forms, which are not uncommonly published. The two features,
"stopping sooner" in the arms race and the availability and use of
standardized solutions, are related. If there were more of a norm to
customize contracts, the payoff to developing and using standardized
solutions would be far smaller, and there would probably be far less
standardization.
But we do not want to paint too rosy a picture of German con-
tracting. First, there are costs to the foregone tailoring itself: to some
extent, German parties may very well compromise in their contracts
on getting (or in any event, specifying) precisely the deal they want.
And the laws, norms, and institutional features that limit the payoff to
contract tailoring and increase the payoff to stopping sooner impose
other costs. Indeed, there are laws limiting "unfair" behavior or be-
havior "not in good faith." The scope of these laws may be uncertain,
and costly to assess. These laws may go too far, preventing parties
who would like to do so from agreeing on a lower standard of
conduct.
Second, what we characterize as German contracting may, in the
not-so-distant future, become extinct. Anglo-American firms are
increasingly bringing their style of practice, notably including Anglo-
American style transaction documentation, to Germany.' Such firms
presently dominate large cross-border transactions and are making
inroads into domestic middle market transactions as well.2 We have
an explanation as to why what we characterize as a superior system
would be supplanted by an inferior system. However, even if our ex-
planation is correct, the ostensibly superior system can be faulted at
least for its inability to resist the ostensibly inferior system. We also
cannot rule out the possibility that the market is rendering its verdict.
Until recently, Germany's transacting community had been fairly
1. For instance, cross-border merger and acquisition (M & A) transactions between
German and non-German parties made up approximately 50 percent of all German M & A
transactions in 2000. MECKL LUCKS, INTERNATIONALE MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, DER
PROZESSORIENTIERTE ANSATZ S. 2 (2002). Such transactions use the longer Anglo-American
style contract documentation rather than the shorter "German" documentation we are discuss-
ing in this Article.
2. Id.; see also HANDBUCH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS S. 97-98 (Gerhard Picot ed.,
2002). Indeed, a recent article attributed some responsibility for German companies' rising costs
of legal services to English law firms. See Unternehmen prifen Anivaltshonorare strenger
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 26.5.2004 S. 25.
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repeat and homogeneous. The arms race in customizing contract
provisions may be impossible to constrain in the more diffuse transac-
tional community that European integration and globalization are
bringing about; with enough customization, the benefits to using and
developing standardized provisions diminish greatly.3
Where is law in our analysis? Its role is critical, but complex. Its
"traditional" role -discouraging breach and compensating the victim
of a breach-may be less important than its other roles. Law may
function expressively 4 to influence norms and practices in the trans-
acting community; it also may provide a focal point around which
parties can coordinate.
5
To be sure, law's traditional role is not unimportant in our analy-
sis. Indeed, compared to U.S. law, German law may more cheaply
yield more certain results in litigation. But in much of our explana-
tion, law plays a more intricate and less direct role, and appropriately
so, given that becoming bound under law is only one of the functions
contracting serves. Indeed, no changes in law can plausibly explain
the shift to Anglo-American style contracting; our account provides
further evidence, if it were needed, that contracting is not in any
simple way merely a creature of law.
Our account also has implications for the debates on the proper
content of and role for contract law. At least where the parties are
sophisticated, and equally so, and externalities are not at issue, there
might seem to be a case for less law; why shouldn't parties know
better what they want than (notoriously flawed) lawmakers, espe-
cially legislators? And not just less mandatory law, but also less
default law, so that parties don't have to incur the expense of con-
tracting around the default. 6 But the less law argument is seriously
undermined even in this best case scenario, because the alternative is
3. Interestingly, the European community is studying the development of standardized
contract terms for use throughout Europe. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/
cons_int/safe shop/fair bus-pract/cont-law/index-en.htm, (last visited May 31, 2004), in which
the initiative is described, and http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/consint/safe-shop/
fair-bus-pract/cont-law/analytical-en.pdf (last visited June 1, 2(X04), summarizing the quite-
divergent views received on the initiative.
4. Some of the most interesting work on the expressive function of law has been done by
Richard McAdams. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law,
86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000) [hereinafter Focal Point Theory]; Richard H. McAdams, An Attitu-
dinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000).
5. McAdams, Focal Point Theory, supra note 4, at 1651; see also Robert E. Scott, Rethink-
ing the Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 91-93 (2003).
6. The "less law" position is forcefully argued in a recent article by Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 540 (2003).
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not nearly as nirvana-esq as is implicitly assumed. As Professor Hill
has argued in Why Contracts Are Written in "Legalese,"7 the complex
business contracts U.S. parties, aided by their smart lawyers, enter
into are second-best products hobbled by their lineage and the agency
costs and behavioral foibles of many of the participants involved in
the process. To appraise what, and how much, contract law there
should be, flawed legislators using a flawed lawmaking process should
be compared with flawed private individuals using a flawed contract-
ing process. Our analysis, and King's experience, suggests that at least
in the circumstances that pertain in Germany, more law can felici-
tously combine with a norm of limiting customization-of "stopping
sooner"-to produce contracts that serve the parties' interests as well
as U.S. contracts do, with fewer words and, presumably, lower trans-
action costs.
This Article proceeds as follows. Section I compares German and
U.S. contracts. The contracts our arguments cover are complex busi-
ness contracts such as merger and acquisition agreements, financing
agreements and many other types of negotiated commercial agree-
ments between sophisticated commercial parties. We exclude cross-
border contracts, since, as noted above, these are increasingly drafted
and negotiated by Anglo-American law firms.
Section II presents our explanation of how German contracts do
as much with fewer words. The benefits, in the form of transaction
cost savings resulting from the German system, are obvious. The key
to our argument is that the associated costs are far smaller than they
might initially seem-that parties can customize quite a bit less with-
out significantly (or commensurately) compromising their ability to
get the deal they want. We show how German law, institutions, prac-
tices, and norms permit German contracting to do as much with fewer
words.
I. THE CONTRACTS
To best articulate our point, we provide a stylized contrast be-
tween U.S. (and, more broadly, Anglo-American) and German
complex business contracts. For ease of exposition, our paradigm is of
acquisition agreements.
7. See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts are Written in "Legalese, "' 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59,
75-81 (2001) [hereinafter Legalesel.
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Our stylized picture of U.S. complex business contracts is as fol-
lows:
* They are very long: a prominent corporate lawyer refers
to "three pound acquisition agreement[s]. ''
* There is a great deal of explanation, qualification, and
limitation in the language.
* There is a great deal of "legalese."
* The legalese is similar from agreement to agreement, but
not exactly the same.
* More broadly, contracts of a particular type of transac-
tion are similar in general coverage, but the specific
language varies considerably from contract to contract. 9
" The initial drafts are relatively divergent, with, for in-
stance, the buyer wanting extensive representations and
the seller wanting to give many fewer, and highly quali-
fied, representations; after a long series of negotiations,
the parties end up in the middle.10
By contrast, our picture of German contracts is as follows:
* The agreements are much "lighter" - by some accounts,
German agreements are one-half or two-thirds the size of
otherwise comparable U.S. agreements."
8. JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 233 (1975).
9. Note, though, that a law firm or a client (for instance, a bank) may develop a form for
one particular type of transaction, and abide by that form very closely in subsequent transac-
tions. A colloquial expression sometimes used for a series of financing transactions done using
very similar documentation is "cookie cutter."
10. This description is of traditionally negotiated transactions. Companies sometimes try to
sell themselves by auctioning themselves off with a prepared set of documents; such documents,
not surprisingly, don't take nearly as extreme a starting position as do the first drafts in tradi-
tionally negotiated transactions.
11. These are estimates given by various practitioners with whom Hill discussed this
matter. King's assessment is that Anglo-American forms are at least twice as long as the Ger-
man forms. His assessment is based not only on his practice experience, but also on his review of
all the major German form books for share and asset purchase agreements. Indeed, the form
book published in 1995 by the largest legal publisher in Germany contains a draft stock pur-
chase agreement that is four pages long. See Beck'sches Formularbuch zum Bfirgerlichen,
HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 82-6 (Unternehmenskauf bei Erwerb von Anteilen 6
Aufl. 1995). By contrast, in that same year the American Bar Association's Model Stock Pur-
chase Agreement was published: that agreement is more than ten times longer. See ABA
MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY (ABA Committee on Negoti-
ated Acquisitions 1995). Professor Thomas Lundmark also notes that German contracts tend to
be much shorter. See Thomas Lundmark, Verbose Contracts, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 12l, 129
(2001).
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* There is much less explanation, qualification, and limita-
tion in the language.
* There is much less legalese.
* The legalese is almost identical from contract to contract.
* Many provisions are quite similar from contract to con-
tract.
" The initial drafts are far closer to one another than are
the U.S. drafts, with the parties ending up far closer to
their starting positions.
Contrast these two standard forms of a forum selection clause:
* American Clause: The exclusive forum for the resolution
of any dispute under or arising out of this agreement shall
be the courts of general jurisdiction of__ and both parties
submit to the jurisdiction of such courts. The parties waive
all objections to such forum based on forum non conven-
iens.
* German Clause: Ausschlieflicher Gerichtsstand ist __
Contrast these two boilerplate phrases:
" American clause: including but not limited to.
* German Clause: insbesondere.
Contrast these two clauses on scope of agency:
• English Clause: The [Agent] agrees that the [Principal]
shall at its sole discretion be able to accept or reject any
order obtained by the [Agent] for any reason including
poor credit rating of the client, bad payment record,
unavailability of materials or textiles, [and] conflict of
interest with existing clients. The [Agent] shall not be enti-
tled to receive any payment for any order so rejected.2
* German Clause: Es steht dem Unternehmer frei, ein vom
Handelsvertreter vermitteltes Geschiift anzuschlief3en oder
abzulehnen.13
Contrast these two portions of a granting clause:
* American clause: __ does hereby grant, bargain, sell, as-
sign, transfer, convey, pledge and confirm, unto Indenture
12. DEBORAH FOSBROOK & ADRIAN C. LANG, THE A-Z OF CONTRACr CLAUSES A.013
(2003).
13. From Art. III Nr. 1 of the standard contract form for sales agency agreements of the
VDMA, a prominent German trade organization in the machine tool industry, as reprinted in
Hopt, Vertrags- und Formularbuch I.G.2 (2. Aufl. 2000).
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Trustee, its successors and assigns, for the security and
benefit of the Indenture Trustee, for itself, and for the
Holders from time to time a security interest in and lien on,
all estate, right, title and interest of in, to and under the
following described property, agreements, rights, interests
and privileges, whether now owned or hereafter acquired,
arising or existing (which collectively. .. , are herein called
the " Trustee Indenture Estate").14
0 German Clause: Der Sicherungsgeber fibereignet der
Bank hiermit den gesamten jeweiligen Bestand an der
sich in befindet und in Zukunft dorthin
verbracht wird.
15
The German contracts we are describing are solely domestic con-
tracts. 16 Such contracts tend to be within the middle market. 7 Larger
dollar (euro) amount contracts typically involve more than one juris-
diction, are frequently governed by foreign (non-German) law, and
are frequently drafted and negotiated by one of the five London-
based law firms that form the "magic circle." These firms are among
14. Adapted from Trust Indenture and Securities Agreement dated as of December 15,
1999 among First Securities Trust Company of Nevada not in its individual capacity except as
otherwise expressly provided herein, but solely as Nonaffiliated Partner Trustee under the Trust
Agreement dated as of December 15, 1999 with Beneficiaries, BJ Services Equipment II, L.P., a
Delaware Limited Partnership and State Street Bank and Trust Company, as Indenture Trustee,
available at http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/bjservices/trustindenture.htm
(last visited May 6, 2004).
15. Graf von Westfalen, Sicherungsuibereignungsvertrag mit Anschlusszession § 1,
Mfinchener Vertragshandbuch Bd. 3 Wirtschaftsrecht II, 5. Aufl. 2004.
16. While we don't think that the fact that we are comparing U.S. complex business
contracts, whether they be middle market or larger, with German middle market contracts,
affects our analysis generally, it does in one respect: in the United States, once contracts become
small enough, parties -especially those using lawyers specializing in smaller transactions, or
indeed, general practitioners not specializing in transactions at all-might to some extent veer
towards the German norm of stopping sooner, on the theory that the stakes are too small to
warrant costs of "getting it exactly right." But our (U.S.) practice experience suggests that it's
hard for lawyers who typically are involved in larger-stakes transactions to stop sooner notwith-
standing the smaller dollars involved.
17. For our purposes, middle market includes, roughly, the larger enterprises referred to by
the European Union definition of small to medium enterprises (usually abbreviated in English
"SME," in German "KMU," and in French "PME"): enterprises with fewer than 250 employ-
ees, turnover not exceeding €50 million, and total assets not exceeding C43 million. (Small
enterprises are defined as having fewer than fifty employees and a balance sheet total of under
C10 million.) See Commission Recommendation), Annex 1. Art 2(l) & 2 (preliminary draft),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/consultations/sme-delinition/consultation2/
153 sme definition 25 6 2002_ppl 1 len.pdf (June 25, 2002).
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20041 HOW DO GERMAN CONTRACTS DO AS MUCH WITH FEWER WORDS? 897
the largest law firms in the world, with offices in many cities in
Europe (including cities in Germany) and elsewhere.S
While our focus is principally on comparing German contracts
with U.S. contracts, much of what we say is applicable more broadly
to civil law contracts versus contracts from common-law regimes with
heavy Anglo-American legal influence. One anecdote, comparing
Belgium with the U.S., is told by Georges A. van Hecke. 9 Van Hecke
recites an incident that occurred in 1962. An American company and
a Belgian company wanted to engage in a share-exchange transaction.
The American party sent a draft of 10,000 words. The Belgians re-
fused to continue with the transaction, apparently because they were
shocked by the length of the draft contract. They agreed to continue
so long as they were allowed to supply the next draft of the contract.
Their draft was 1,400 words, and was "found by the American party
to include all the substance that was really needed." 20 The contract
was signed and performed to all parties' satisfaction.
II. OUR EXPLANATION
A. Introduction and Theory
The ultimate function of contracting is, of course, to create the
largest possible transactional "pie." To understand how contracting
serves this function, we must understand what might otherwise de-
crease the size of the pie. Parties' propensity for opportunism-acting
in their own interest and contrary to the interests of their contracting
partner-can decrease the size of the pie.21 Parties use contracting to
constrain each other's opportunism, marshalling both legal and extra-
legal forces. A party binds itself to act in the other party's interest in
ways specified in the agreement: to tell the truth about the present,
18. See, e.g., Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, Von den Vorziigen des deutschen Rechts
gegeniiber anglo-amerikanischen Vertragsmustern, 102 ZVGLRWIss 53 (2003). We gloss over the
differences between U.S. and English practice here, since, in salient respects, the two types of
practices are the same.
19. Georges A. van Hecke, A Civilian Looks at the Common-Law Law ver, in
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: CHOICE OF LAW AND LANGUAGE 5, 10 (Willis L. M. Reese ed.,
1962).
20. Id. Van Hecke's story is also recounted in John H. Langbein, Comparative Civil Proce-
dure and the Style of Complex Contracts, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 381 (1987) 1hereinafter Com-
plex Contracts].
21. The classic statement of the problem is of course George A. Akerlof's, in The Market
for "Lemons:" Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
CHICAGO-KENT LA IV REVIEW
and act in agreed-upon ways in the future. But even if parties' inter-
ests were (and were expected to remain) perfectly aligned, they
would still enter into contracts to reduce non-adversarial transaction
costs. Parties use contracting to arrange for and coordinate the acqui-
sition and conveyance of information and the performance of particu-
lar tasks, as well as to allocate risks of events that neither is in a
position to control. The contracting process thus aims to reduce op-
portunism (an adversarial transaction cost) as well as non-adversarial
transaction costs.22 The more cheaply it can do so, the better. The
contracting process also provides an opportunity for the parties to
come to know one another and their own and the other party's expec-
tations about the relationship; indeed, at the outset, if they have not
transacted with each other before, they are appraising whether they
want to have a relationship at all.
23
In the United States, contract drafting and negotiation is far
more about addressing opportunism than is contract drafting and
negotiation in Germany. The use of contract drafting and negotiation
to constrain opportunism is very costly, as we will argue in Part II.B
below, resembling an arms race in which each party has to make
considerable expenditures simply to keep up with the other. German
attempts to constrain opportunism are less costly because German
parties and their lawyers abide by a norm24 to stop the arms race far
sooner. Moreover, as we will argue in Part II.C below, Germany does
better than does the United States in helping parties deal with com-
mon contracting issues by providing standardized "good enough"
solutions; overall transaction costs of contracting are thereby reduced.
22. These have attracted much less attention in the literature. A notable exception is
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE
L.J. 239, 296-98 (1984) (describing how an "earn-out" provision in an acquisition agreement is a
low-cost solution to the difficulties of valuing a future earnings stream). In most instances ad-
versarial and non-adversarial components are both present.
23. The extent to which contracting is about parties' defining and establishing their rela-
tionship is traditionally given short shrift in the literature. Hill discusses this matter in Claire A.
Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business Contracting, 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 29, 31-32 (2001) 1hereinafter Language and Norms]. Where the transacting community is
less repeat and less homogeneous than it is in Germany, as it is in the United States, the more
protracted process may be quite valuable, since parties have a great deal to learn about one
another. In Germany, where thus far it's been more the particular transactional relationship that
needs defining than the parties needing to know one another, a less protracted process may be
cost-effective. King is less inclined than Hill to think a U.S.-style protracted negotiation process
will have additional value relative to the German process even in the U.S.; he thinks that a
larger proportion of the process consists of an arms race than Hill does.
24. There is no agreed-upon definition of norms. A useful discussion of norms in law and
economics is Richard H. McAdams & Eric Rasmusen, Norms in Law and Economics, in
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Polinsky & Shavell eds., forthcoming 2005).
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20041 HOW DO GERMAN CONTRACTS DO AS MUCH WITH FEWER WORDS? 899
B. Opportunism
1. The Norm of "Stopping Sooner"
Constraining opportunism through contract drafting and negotia-
tion means constantly being on the lookout for strategic handles or
ambiguities that the other party might exploit, and making sure to
address them. The effect on contract documentation is cumulative:
Parties in the U.S. start with "forms" that are already quite cluttered
with language from previous deals in which the forms were used, and
clutter them further.25 Nobody will have the incentive to truncate,
weeding out what's unlikely or just unnecessarily convoluted. Indeed,
on the contrary, everybody (the people constituting the client firm
and the law firm, at both the lower and higher levels, and the firms
themselves) will have the incentive to keep what there is and add
whatever they can think of that might go wrong or might expressly
rebut some possible misreading of the contract language.
Some of the costs of prolix U.S.-style contracts are obvious. Each
party busily searches for strategic handles that the other party may
have provided for, knowing that it can't be assured of finding all of
them, and knowing, too, that it can't completely prevent the other
party from using the contract, and legal process, strategically. The
search isn't just confined to discrete areas: everything potentially
could be a strategic handle. And each party needs to expend costs to
convince the other party that it is not using strategic handles itself.
The more "substantive" the provision at issue, the more potent are
arguments that strategic handles might remain and must be detected
and definitively rebutted. But even as to common definitions and
logistical and other coordination-type provisions, there are many
variants and each party (or her lawyer) will often prefer her own, if
only because she's more familiar with it-and is sure it doesn't con-
tain any strategic handles she doesn't know about.
A few costs bear stressing. Consider the costs associated with
addressing contingencies. There is a great deal of emphasis on
addressing even remote contingencies, in significant part for fear that
should the contingencies arise and there be no contractual specifica-
25. Hill discusses this topic in Legalese, supra note 7, at 73-74, 80-81. Among the "clutter"
are the long litanies of examples ("including but not limited to.. .") that elaborate on the con-
tract's general terms and statements. In Germany, by contrast, only the general statements are
used, without the litany of examples. See Picot, supra note 2.
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tion of rights and duties, parties might act strategically. Parties spend
a great deal of time anticipating and providing for contingencies that
won't occur. Standard economic theory suggests that contingencies
will be addressed if the cost of not having addressed them (that is, the
probability that they'll occur multiplied by the cost of not having
addressed them should they occur) exceeds the cost of addressing
them.26 In a world where ubiquitous opportunism is the working as-
sumption, this condition will very often be met-and we can expect a
great deal of costly contingency planning.
Moreover, it's not as though the only costs of thinking about con-
tingencies are the structuring costs of considering possible contractual
solutions. There are also the costs to the parties' relationship. The
lawyer raises the possibility of some bad event; what one party says
about how she'd react to the event may damage the relationship even
if the event never occurs and even if the party would not have reacted
in the way she described. The dynamic is particularly familiar to law-
yers involved in negotiating the formation of small businesses, but is
also present to some degree even for the largest businesses.27
Furthermore, recall that the subject matter of the contracts at is-
sue is complex and singular. Planning for contingencies is likely to be
far less satisfactory than it is in a simple purchase of commodities, for
instance, where what can go wrong is well understood, and there are a
well-specified set of contract solutions. By contrast, in the types of
transactions at issue in this Article, it is far harder to classify what can
go wrong in a manner that would dictate one or even a specified set of
solutions. If opportunism weren't at issue, the parties might find
agreement on process or even an agreement to agree preferable. 28 But
26. Note the heroic assumption that all of these numbers can be estimated within a tracta-
ble range.
27. We don't want to make too much of this point, though. If, in the United States, it's the
norm to raise a certain number of points of this sort, a party may signal institutional competence
by doing so and a susceptibility to being taken advantage of if she doesn't.
28. While, as a matter of black letter law in the United States, "agreements to agree" are
unenforceable, courts strive to "construct an enforceable contract out of whatever raw materials
or intention the parties have made available." "While the IU.S.] courts will not enforce a mere
'agreement to agree,' there is a tendency ... to find an understanding by reasonable reference
to custom or to the parties' previous conduct." MARVIN A. CHIRLSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 87-88 (4th ed. 2001). U.S. parties might even include in
their contracts a provision they thought might be unenforceable as an agreement to agree if they
thought the contingency at issue might arise when reputational and relational constraints would
provide any needed enforcement, and the costs of making the provision enforceable at law
would exceed the incremental benefits.
German law is similar to U.S. law, albeit a bit more permissive in enforcing agreements
to agree. An agreement to agree will be enforceable (Vorvertrag) if there's an appropriate and
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fear of opportunism may lead parties to prefer a solution specified ex
ante notwithstanding that they can predict that the optimal solution ex
post might be quite different. A response might be that if there is a
preferable solution ex post, the parties should agree to use it, notwith-
standing the ex ante agreement. Perhaps-but even then, the (not
inconsiderable) costs of coming up with the ex ante solution will have
been incurred.
There is another cost to contracting focused on constraining
opportunism. Parties spend a great deal of time establishing specific
prohibitions, again in significant part because they fear that the other
party will take advantage of whatever latitude it is given. The intima-
tion of a very specific prohibition is that what is not prohibited is
permitted. If the subject had never been broached, a general prohibi-
tion, or perhaps no prohibition, might have invoked a norm with
greater breadth than the breadth of the specific contractual prohibi-
tion. Extra-legal sanctions would attach to breaching the norm; a
party might be more broadly constrained by the general prohibition
(or no prohibition) and the norm than by the specific contractual
prohibition. Consider a prohibition against related party transactions.
If a dollar minimum is given, the intimation is clearly that transactions
below that dollar amount are permitted. With a general prohibition,
or perhaps no prohibition at all, the norm might be to avoid any such
transactions, or at least many more of them. To overstate a bit, speci-
ficity in a contract provision may be an invitation to honor the fact
but violate the spirit. 9
defensible way to find enough to enforce; if not, it may be an unenforceable expression of intent
(German: Absichtserklirung). See Palandt / Heichrichs, Rn. 19 zu § 145 BGB.
29. Relatedly, consider the U.S practice in many types of agreements to (a) have specific
(one could say "narrow") factual disclosures made by each party as negotiated for bv the other,
and (b) not have a residual representation that, in effect, a party has told the other party what
the other party would (reasonably) want to know. The potential for strategic behavior in mak-
ing only the "narrow" disclosure is clear, an excellent analogy is the U.S. accounting profes-
sion's ability to certify as accurate financial statements that abide by the applicable rules even
though the spirit of the rules is arguably being violated, as was the case in Enron. To be fair, in
the context of U.S. contracts, common law doctrines might permit recovery for "narrow" disclo-
sure that turns out to omit material information. But sophisticated commercial parties dealing
with one another do not take much comfort in a court's giving them more protection than they
expressly bargained for. And they are reasonable in so doing, especially since courts might very
well expect them to be able to look after themselves.
Note, too, that the argument used against including a residual representation also turns
on the potential for strategic behavior. The party asked to give the representation responds that
she doesn't know what the other party would want to know, and that giving the representation
would give the other party an open-ended invitation to claim breach- there will surely be some-
thing the other party can claim she would (reasonably) have wanted to know that wasn't
disclosed.
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It is therefore quite costly to deal with opportunism through the
contract drafting and negotiation process. Why are parties in the U.S.
incurring these costs? In our view, parties have gotten locked into an
arms race in which each seeks to ferret out the other's possible strate-
gic handles at every turn. The result is U.S.-style extensive custom
tailoring of contracts. The participants in the process either believe,
or persuade themselves to believe, that "every semicolon matters."
The agents involved-the lawyers, answering to their clients, the
people representing the clients answering to their seniors-will err on
the side of more custom tailoring. Abiding by the norm will never
engender criticism, 30 but if there should be a dispute over the contract
language later on, not having abided by the norm may very well be
punished: could more care have clarified the language sufficiently to
avoid the dispute (or to easily prevail at litigation)?
This horror scenario looms large even though the main period
with which contracting parties are concerned is the period in which
they are getting along and have no need to resort to legal enforce-
ment. During this period, the parties may routinely waive strict
adherence to the contract; they may not even consult the contract at
all. It is only if the relationship begins to sour-when litigation either
is occurring or contemplated-that the actual words of their contract
take on paramount importance. 31 And even then, the chance that the
actual words will make as great a difference as getting it "exactly
right" costs is small. This is particularly true in the United States,
where the results of litigation are quite uncertain. Even in Germany,
where, as we discuss in Parts II.B.2 and II.C.3 below, the results of
litigation may be more certain, the computation should come out the
same way, just because of the high costs of customization. And this is
so even without discounting for the low probability of litigation. The
customization expenditure must be weighed against the expected like-
lihood that the matter would have to be resolved in litigation, as well
as the incremental value of the court's interpretation of the custom-
ized provision over the court's interpretation of a less customized
provision; the computation should often argue against customization.
Parties in the U.S. would be better off if they could agree to stop the
arms race sooner. But such an agreement is difficult to make and
30. Hill makes this point in Legalese, supra note 7, at 68, n. 21.
31. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coopera-
tion Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) Ihereinafter Creating
Cooperation], at 1743-44.
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enforce, especially when the arms race has been the reigning modus
operandi. And, in what is in part an agency cost dynamic, no one in-
volved in the process can afford to take a chance on unilaterally "lay-
ing down her arms" in the hope and expectation that the other party
will do the same.
In Germany, the norm is to "stop sooner" in the customization
process. A lawyer in Germany attempting U.S.-style negotiating has
thus far seemed overly aggressive, lacking in institutional compe-
tence, or both. By contrast, a lawyer in the United States is seen as
lacking zeal or institutional competence or both if she does not nego-
tiate "every" term aggressively. Lest one think that a simple story of
differing lawyers' incentives explains the contrasting styles of drafting
and negotiation, it should be noted that in both Germany and the
United States, transaction lawyers are compensated roughly in the
same manner-the hours spent are multiplied by the lawyer's hourly
rate.32 There doesn't seem to be any obvious reason why German
lawyers have less of an incentive to spend time negotiating and revis-
ing contract documentation than do U.S. lawyers. One could say that
in the United States, U.S.-style zeal is rewarded with professional
advancement-partners who observe a junior lawyer being zealous in
this manner are impressed, and clients are, if not impressed, at least
not depressed. In Germany, the same conduct might not be rewarded.
But what would account for this difference'?
As we discuss in Part II.B.3 below, the German transacting
community has thus far been relatively homogeneous and repeat.
Such a community may encourage the development and effective
enforcement of a norm to "stop sooner." Indeed, enforcement is key:
Once one party stops abiding by the norm and begins pushing for
customization, the other party will almost certainly do so as well. De-
viations can readily be punished.
Our recourse to norms might seem wholly unsatisfactory. On
what authority do we claim that the German norm of stopping sooner
exists? Our evidence is admittedly anecdotal-but so is evidence for
the presumably uncontroversial proposition that U.S.-style negotiat-
ing is what it is.
3 3
32. NIGEL G. FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 98 (3d ed.
2002); Lawrence W. Schonbrun, Attorney Billing Practices in Germany: An American Perspec-
tive, 19 INT'L LEGAL PRAC. 120, 121 (1994).
33. Certainly, the popular press offers considerable, albeit anecdotal, support for this
characterization. See, e.g., James Baxter, Insolvency: On the Bandwagon, LEGAL WEEK, Jan. 22,
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2. The Role Of Civil Procedure
Differences in the two countries' civil procedure probably play a
role. In the United States, each party presumes, correctly, that the
other party can cause it considerable difficulties by advancing a stra-
tegic misinterpretation of a contract provision. A party advancing
such a misinterpretation might prevail in court. Or, even if the party
did not prevail, it might nevertheless be able to impose considerable
costs on the other party, at the pre-trial stage (by, for instance, requir-
ing it to respond to multiple motions or make its officers available for
extensive discovery and depositions) and at the trial stage if the case
were not earlier dismissed. Strategic misinterpretation thus can be a
worthwhile strategy.
34
German civil procedure may limit the extent to which strategic
misinterpretation is a worthwhile strategy. Limits on pre-trial discov-
ery35 and motion practice, as well as the "loser pays" rule, vastly con-
strict a party's ability to use litigation to impose costs on the other
party.36 Moreover, the judicial panel trying the case controls much
2004 (referring to "highly aggressive U.S.-style negotiating."); see also Langbein, Complex
Contracts, supra note 19. at 383.
34. The computation that the strategy is worthwhile in a particular instance will necessarily
take into account any expected reputational costs, especially if it's hard to advance the misinter-
pretation as legitimate; the possibility of such costs constrains use of the strategy in some in-
stances.
35. Note, however, that by introducing Section 142 ZPO in the code of civil procedure, the
German Parliament has taken a small step towards American-style discovery. See, e.g., Joachim
Zekol, Die Pflicht zur Vorlage von Urkunden im Zivilprozess-Amerikanische Verhaltnisse in
Deutschland?, 43 NJW 3129 (2002). This Section allows the court to order third parties to
produce relevant documents, so long as the burden on the third parties is not "excessive" and
other conditions are met. In Sections 137 IV; 141 1 S. 1; 278 II 2, 3; 287 I, S. 3; 445 ff; 613 1 1
ZPO, the new ZPO departs from previous practice wherein parties couldn't normally prove
their cases through their own testimony. The new ZPO accords more of a role to testimony of
parties, although parties still do not have the same status as regular witnesses. This also brings
the German Civil Procedure a small step closer to the American practice. Dagmar Coester-
Waltjen, Parteiaussage und Parteivernehmung am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, ZZP 2000, 269
(278 ff).
36. The general rule in Germany for costs in Section 91 Abs. I Satz 2 ZPO is that a loser
pays the costs in the proceeding, which include attorneys' fees at the rates governed by the
applicable statute. A full comparative account of how the U.S. rule versus the "loser pays" rule
affects contracting parties' incentives in writing contracts and in litigating is beyond the scope of
this Article.
I[Vol 79:889
20041 HOW DO GERMAN CONTRACTS DO AS MUCH WITH FEWER WORDS? 905
more of the proceedings than would an American judge:37 the panel
conducts fact-finding in a far more informal and less costly process.38
The German system gives judges a great deal of power. It there-
fore ought to have good ways of assuring judicial quality. And, we
think, it does. German judges are neither elected nor appointed in a
political process. Rather, they are selected on the basis of law school
success. The selection usually occurs immediately after law school,
and is followed by specialized judicial training. Career advancement
in the judiciary turns largely on the results of peer review. 9
In most litigated complex contract cases, 40 disputes will be heard
by a commercial panel4t consisting of a professional judge and two
business-people.42 The two people are appointed on the recommenda-
tion of the local chamber of commerce. 43 The lay judges have to meet
certain minimum statutory qualifications as to their business experi-
ence and position. 4 Should a litigant wish to appeal, a higher court,
whose members are likely to be specialized in commercial matters
and to have advanced based on merit, will review the lower court
37. In Germany, the cases at issue are always tried by judges; there is no provision for jury
trials of such cases. Rolf Sturner, Why are Europeans Afraid to Litigate in the United States?, 45
CONFERNEZE E SEMINARE 5 (Roma 2001). In the United States, jury trials for such cases are
permitted, but are exceedingly rare.
38. In Continental litigation, the judge is the one who takes evidence, summons and exam-
ines witnesses and parties, and reviews the evidence. See John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826-28 (1985) [hereinafter, The German
Advantage]. It should be noted that Langbein's article, which presents a highly positive view of
German civil procedure, provoked a strong critique by Ronald J. Allen et al., The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative
Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705 (1988); Samuel R. Gross. The American Advantage: The
Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734 (1987); and John Reitz, Why We Probably
Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure. 75 IOWA L. REV. 987 (1990). Allen et
al.7s critique provoked a response by Langbein, John H. Langbein, Trashing the German Advan-
tage, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 763 (1988) [hereinafter, Trashing the German Advantage]; to which
Allen et. al also responded. Ronald J. Allen, Idealization & Caricature in Comparative Scholar-
ship, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 785 (1988). Overall, King's experience is more in accord with
Langbein's view than Allen's.
39. See The German Advantage, supra note 35, at 850. Of course, peer review is not perfect;
still, King's experience is that judges who advance tend to be of high quality. Langbein also
thinks very highly of German judges. See id. at 862.
40. As is the case for U.S. parties, parties to German contracts sometimes agree to arbitra-
tion. Arbitration costs are, of course, far lower than litigation costs.
41. Kammer fiir Handelssachen. See § 394 ZPO; §§ 95 If GVG.
42. Certain "legal" decisions (such as those concerning jurisdiction, default judgments,
posting of bonds, calculation of court costs and attorneys' fees) have to be made by the profes-
sional judge. § 349 ZPO. However, most matters are decided by a majority of the judges.
43. Membership in the Chambers of Commerce is mandatory for most German companies.
German law delegates a number of functions to the Chambers of Commerce, including the
appointment of lay judges to commercial panels.
44. See § 109 GVG as to minimum age and other qualifications.
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decision.45 Thus, a judicial panel hearing a commercial dispute is very
likely to have expertise in commercial matters. 6
We must consider a counter-argument to our position: two ad-
versarial fact-finders, such as we have in the United States, will have a
stronger incentive to flesh out the facts of a case than will the judges
on a German court.47 The adversarial fact-finders in the United States
have extensive pre-trial discovery48 at their disposal as well; they don't
just have more "will," but also a better way, to ferret out "the truth."
While we think this objection has merit in general terms, we think
that in the context with which we are concerned, litigation between
commercially sophisticated parties in a complex transaction, a well-
selected and well-trained judge with experience in cases involving
complex transactions, together with two lay judges who have business
experience, should be able to ferret out facts effectively and in any
event, should not systematically disadvantage the plaintiff or defen-
dant. Certainly, this is King's experience. Indeed, more broadly, we
think the overall picture we have painted, in which strategic misuse of
litigation is less of a concern in Germany than in the United States,
accords with the anecdotal sense of a great many practitioners in a
position to compare the two systems. Effort spent putting or leaving
strategic handles in a contract may simply have less of a payoff in
Germany than it does in the United States. Accordingly, each party
should spend fewer resources to that end, and should spend fewer
resources trying to detect the other party's efforts to that end.
There may also be fewer possible strategic misinterpretations
that a party can advance. Because German contracts avoid the U.S.-
style cumulation that results in significant part from the "arms race"
we described above, the contracts may simply be easier to interpret.
49
45. See Complex Contracts, supra note 19, at 387.
46. In this regard, consider the widely-acknowledged benefits in the U.S. to litigating
complex corporate law matters in the courts with the most expertise and experience in corpo-
rate law, the Delaware courts, rather than in courts of other states. Indeed, both the authors can
attest to the fact that every lawyer, when asked by a client "Why are we incorporating in
Delaware?" includes in the list of reasons that Delaware courts are more experienced in corpo-
rate law.
47. Allen et al., supra note 35, at 710-11.
48. SchUtze, Zum Stand des deutsch-amerikanischen Justizkonfliktes, RIW 2004, 162,
163.
49. Consider, for instance, the many provisions in U.S. contracts that contain difficult and
tortured clauses qualifying the provisions' applicability ("anything in the foregoing to the
contrary notwithstanding... or "the foregoing shall not be deemed to include..." ) Consider,
too, the provisions containing long litanies of examples mentioned in note 24, supra. These
types of provisions reflect in significant part the cumulative effect of the arms race. And it's not
just strategic misinterpretation that parties may need to worry less about. It may be possible for
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3. The Role of Extra-Legal Forces
We argued above that German parties don't seek to constrain
opportunism as much by contract language as do U.S. parties. We
discussed two reasons: the norm to "stop sooner" in customizing con-
tracts, and various features of German civil procedure. Another pos-
sible reason is that extra-legal forces might be more effective at
constraining opportunism than they are in the U.S.
Our account is familiar from the norms literature and, in particu-
lar, the work of Lisa Bernstein.50 Germany's business community is
small compared to the business community of the United States.
Many industries are concentrated in particular regions;51 transactions
have typically taken place among those in the same industries. Trade
associations exist in many industries, and are more important than
their counterparts in the United States. 52 Acquisitions by firms from
outside the close community-for instance, by private equity firms-
have, until recently, been relatively rare. 53
parties to worry less about even benign misinterpretations. German grammar is helpful in this
regard. In German, referents are clearer; the grammar makes it more likely that a given phrase
will have only one unambiguous reading. For instance, German has three genders to refer to
things that are not natural persons. In a sentence referring to the target entity (das Unternehmen
= neuter), a trade union (die Geiverkschaft = feminine) and the workers council (der Betriebsrat
= masculine), it is possible in German to unambiguously determine the reference just by prepo-
sitions and endings. In English, all three would have the same reference (it). Provisions intended
to constrain possible misinterpretations of other provisions are therefore less likely to be
needed.
50. See, e.g., Creating Cooperation, supra note 29; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Prelimi-
nary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999).
51. For instance, most of the roller bearing industry manufacturers are located in Schwein-
furt, a small town between Nrnberg and Frankfurt. The world's precision surgical instrument
industry-aside from certain low priced manufacturers in Pakistan-is located in and around
Tuttlingen, a small town an hour south of Stuttgart. King was on a plane seated next to an
executive of a large American health products company that distributes surgical instruments.
When asked what he did when he was in Germany, the executive reported that he spent all his
time in and around Tuttlingen and knew not only every restaurant in the vicinity but the name
of the cooks.
52. See, e.g., Allgemeine Lieferungs- und Zahlungsbedingungen der WSM-Industrie fiir
lndustriegeschilfte mit dem Ausland (Trade Association of the Steel and Metalworking
Industry), available at http://www.wsm-net.de/wsmagbah.doc (Apr. 2002); Banken- und
Sparkassen-AGBs (GT&C of banks and savings banks), die AGBs der Treuhandanstalt und die
VDMA-Bedingungen, reprinted in Friedrich Graf von Wcstphalen, Vertragsrecht und AGB-
Klauselwerke.
53. Constantin Christofidis & Olivier Debande, Financing Innovative Firms Through
Venture Capital, available at http://www.gfgnet.com/files/Financing-Innovative-Firms-
ThroughVC.pdf (Feb. 2001) (last visited May 20, 2004) discusses how European venture
capital activity began a long time after U.S. activity. The article notes that it has recently been
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More broadly, German contracting nowadays resembles in some
respects U.S. contracting in the early 1980s and before, when people
involved in complex business transactions, including both parties and
their lawyers, were in more repeat and homogeneous communities.
54
Parties engage in transactions within the same communities, using the
same law firms. Furthermore, the few big banks in Germany have
considerable equity stakes in many companies 5 It is not unusual to
find a bank involved in both sides of a transaction. 56 For all these
reasons, it might thus have been possible to achieve consensus as to
norms of good behavior, and develop good mechanisms for detecting
and punishing deviations from the norms. The U.S. complex business
transacting community also has norms of good behavior and mecha-
nisms for detecting and punishing deviations, but these may not work
quite as well as they do in Germany because the U.S. community is
less homogeneous and less repeat than the German community. 57
Parties in Germany therefore might have more effective alternate
means of constraining opportunism than do parties in the United
States, and might not need to rely as much on the legal enforcement
of contract terms (and the threat thereof) as do their U.S. counter-
parts.
4. The Role of Substantive Law: Good Faith
Also relevant to our account is that German substantive law im-
poses considerably stronger obligations of good faith than does U.S.
rapidly increasing but that German has "lagged" behind other countries that have more of an
"equity market culture."
54. Certainly, this was King's and Hill's experience regarding U.S. practice in the 1980s,
and it is King's experience regarding German practice now. For a discussion of current German
legal culture, see Erhard Blankenburg, Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands Compared to
Neighboring Germany, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1998).
55. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 171-77 (1994).
56. This state of affairs may be changing; equity in German firms is increasingly owned by
capital markets investors rather than banks. See Eric Nowak, Recent Developments in German
Capital Markets and Corporate Governance, 14 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 35 (2001); Erik Theissen,
Organized Equity Markets in Germany, CFS Working Paper No. 2003/17 (March 2003), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=427020. This change is being accelerated by the capital adequacy
rules to be imposed by the New Basel Capital Accord, available at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3full.pdf (last visited May 31, 2004). The Accord effectively will
discourage banks from holding significant equity interests in industrial companies. All of this
being said, at present, German banks continue to hold significant equity interests in companies
of all types.
57. One of us has discussed the heterogeneity of the U.S. complex transacting community.
See Hill, Language and Norms, supra note 22, at 34.
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law.5 Some of these obligations can be contracted around by the
parties, but some cannot. The original source of these obligations is
Section 242 of the German Civil Code (BGB),59 a section that courts
have interpreted exceedingly broadly. But many of these obligations
have been codified in separate sections of the law.60
In their treatise Good Faith in European Contract Law,
Whittaker and Zimmermann describe the coverage and operation of
Section 242:
Thus, it is generally recognized today that § 242 BGB operates...
so as to supplement the law.... It specifies the way in which con-
tractual performance has to be rendered and it gives rise to a host
of ancillary, or supplementary, duties that may arise under a con-
tract: duties of information, documentation, co-operation, protec-
tion, disclosure, etc. These duties can also apply in the
precontractual situation and they may extend after the contract has
been performed.... In the second place, § 242 BGB serves to limit
the exercise of contractual rights .... Thus, for instance, going
against one's own previous conduct ... is frowned upon and so is
relying upon a right which has been dishonestly acquired...
demanding something that has to be given back immedi-
ately .... proceeding ruthlessly and without due consideration to
the reasonable interests of the other party,... or reacting in a way
which must be considered as excessive when compared with the
event occasioning the reaction.... Lapse of time may also lead to a
loss of right even before the relevant period of prescription has
expired.... Finally, and most problematically, § 242 BGB has also
been used to interfere in contractual relations in order to avoid
grave injustice. 6'
58. See generally SIMON WHFITAKER & REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, GOOD FAITH IN
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (2000).
59. For a general discussion of Section 242. see id. at 18-32: see also Canaris. Claus-
Wilhelm, Wandlungen dcs Schuldrechts - Tendenzen zu seiner ,,Materialisierung", AcP 2000,
273. Notwithstanding the conventional credo that civil law systems lack any role for precedent,
the jurisprudence of Section 242 has developed in a common-law like manner. Indeed, more
broadly, the idea that civil law systems lack any role for precedent is, according to commenta-
tors, overstated. See UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 84 (1997); see also
WHITTAKER & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 59, at 23 ("4[llt must be noted that German lawyers
have become accustomed to thick layers of case law emerging from the interstices of their Code
and.., they have learn[ed] to cope with this phenomenon."). Moreover, doctrines developed in
civil law courts are sometimes codified.
60. There are other general statutes: Section 157 BGB, which provides that the interpreta-
tion of contracts be "governed by the precepts of good faith," and Section 138 1 BGB, a provi-
sion "with an ancient pedigree" that is "much stricter than § 242 BGB" and has been the basis
for "a number of startling developments over the last couple of years." WHITTAKER &
ZIMMERMANN, supra note 55, at 29.
61. WHITTAKER & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 55, at 24-25. Whittaker & Zimmermann
characterize the quoted portion as a rough survey of "how the requirements of § 242 BGB have
been specified over the years." Id. at 26.
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An important application of Section 242 BGB that has been
codified is Section 9 of the Standard Contract Terms Act of 1976
("Section 9"). Section 9 makes invalid any term to which specific at-
tention has not been drawn (a "general term and condition") 62 that
constitutes "unfair surprise" 63 or is "unfairly detrimental" to the non-
drafting party.64 The applicability of Section 9 cannot be waived.
65
Another important application of Section 242 BGB that has been
codified is "culpa in contrahendo ("CiC"). ' '66 Cic is, for our purposes,
principally a duty to act in good faith during negotiation of the con-
tract, and a warranty given by sellers in acquisitions. Cic might render
a seller liable for "insufficient" disclosures to a buyer when U.S. law
would have given the buyer no recourse. Cic can, and sometimes is,
waived.
67
62. Pursuant to § 305 Abs. 1 Satz I BGB, the heightened scrutiny applies to clauses which
are intended to be used in a number of contracts. It is not necessary that the same party intends
to use the clause again; using a clause from a form (such as the forms of acquisition agreements
of law firms) puts the clause within the purview of § 305 c BGB. See Palandt/Heinrichs, Rn. 9 zu
§ 305 BGB. Interestingly, in a recent decision suggesting that judges may be eager to interpret
Section 9 expansively, the BGH (the highest German court for civil cases) held that parties were
subject to Section 9 if they adopt part, but not all, of the VOB-B, a commonly used statutory
standard form for construction contracts.
Note that Section 9 is to some extent comparable to UCC §2-207 (2)(b), which provides
that a term included in an acceptance doesn't become part of the parties' contract if it materially
alters the contract. The coverage of the U.C.C. provision is, of course, far more limited than that
of the German provision, insofar as it applies only to sales of goods between merchants.
63. § 305 c BGB.
64. § 307 Abs. 1 BGB. Section 305 Abs. 2 BGB defines "unfairly detrimental" by reference
to the basic principles of statutory law.
65. § 306 a BGB.
66. Effective as of January 1, 2002, the doctrine of cic was codified in § 311 Abs. 2 BGB.
For an extensive discussion of the doctrine, see HAN BUCHTA REHM,
AUFKLARUNGSPFLICHTEN IM VERTRAGSRECHT (2003). For a discussion of how the doctrine
applies in the context of negotiations concerning mergers and acquisitions, see HANS-JOACHIM
HOLZAPFEL & REINHARD POLLATH, UNTERNEHMENSKAUF IN RECHT UND PRAXIS, Rn. 492-
438 (11 Aufl. 2003).
67. In one case in which cic was not waived, the BGH found a seller of a computer com-
pany liable for failing to disclose that shortly before the transaction closed, contracts represent-
ing 40 percent of the sales of the company had been terminated. BGH NJW 1995, 1549f. The
BGH has likewise held a party liable in culpa in contrahendo when the party noticed that the
other party had made an error in calculation and didn't inform the other party. BGH NJW 1980,
180 (dictum). Similarly, a seller of a scaffolding business which excluded all warranties but did
not expressly exclude liability for negotiation in good faith (culpa in contrahendo) was held
liable in culpa in contrahendo for having negotiated the purchase price on the basis of financial
statements that negligently overstated the scaffolding owned by the company. The court noted
that since 70 percent of the scaffolding was on customers' construction sites, this quantity could
not be checked or verified by the purchaser. BHG NJW 1979, 33. See also Picot,
Unternehmenskauf und Restrukturierung § V Rn. 90 (2. Aufl. 1998); THOMAS RODDER,
OLIVER HOTZEL, & THOMAS MUELLER-THUNS, UNTERNEHMENSKAUF
UNTERNEHMENSVERKAUF § 9 Rn. 145 (2003). For a very detailed and critical comparative
discussion of cic, see GEHARD REHM, AUFKLARUNGSPFLICHTEN IM VERTRAGSRECHT 200-02
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Our verdict on German law on good faith is rather more mixed
than our verdict on the other aspects of German law, procedure, and
norms we discuss in this Article. The scope of German law on good
faith is uncertain;" parties may incur costs to assess the scope, and
may feel constrained in their behavior in order to leave a margin for
error. Indeed, the law may be forcing on some sophisticated parties
higher standards of conduct than they would require of one another.
But there are benefits. For instance, Section 9 may encourage ef-
ficient information-provision by a drafting party. She must direct the
non-drafting party's attention to any provision that she fears may be
deemed "unfairly surprising" or "unfairly detrimental" or risk that
the provision will be invalidated. The non-drafting party may there-
fore be able to truncate its review of the draft.
More broadly, if and to the extent parties (or at least a majority
of them) would agree upon, and comport themselves consistently
with, these standards in any event, or, expressively, the standards
contribute to the existence and perpetuation of norms and reputa-
tional communities which make for less costly transacting overall, the
good faith obligations might be beneficial. On balance, therefore, our
assessment as to whether the laws on good faith help German con-
tracts do as much with fewer words is mixed. They may help German
contracts have fewer words, but perhaps only at the cost of limiting
the parties' ability to get the deal they want, and of introducing some
uncertainty as to how courts will interpret contractual obligations.
C. Standardized Solutions
1. In General
The foregoing has dealt with opportunism: the concern each
party has that the other party will try to benefit itself at the expense
of the aggregate transactional pie. But contracting has its non-
adversarial components as well. Germany does better in helping par-
ties deal with non-adversarial components of contracting by providing
standardized "good enough" solutions to common transacting prob-
(2003). Semler, in H6lters, Handbuch des Unternehmens- und Beteiligungskaufs § VI Rn. 14 (4.
Aufl. 1996), notes that there are progressively fewer cases of failure to make unsolicited disclo-
sures as due diligence lists become more standard and comprehensive.
68. This is a view held by many commentators. See, for instance, HOLZAPFEL & POLLATH,
supra note 63, at Rn. 518, who argue that cic should be waived "to reduce uncertainty by the
seller as to the circumstances under which he may be liable."
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lems. And the standardized "good enough" solutions should help
parties reduce transaction costs of dealing with adversarial problems
as well. That there are standardized "good enough" solutions in
Germany owes not inconsiderably to the "stopping sooner" norm we
discussed in the previous Part. Without such a norm, the benefits to
either developing or using standardized solutions would be low. But
with such a norm, the benefits to standardized solutions are consider-
able. Certainly, there are network effects of having standardized solu-
tions in common use: quick recognition that a known provision is
being used truncates costs of review of a document, and the likeli-
hood that a definitive interpretation of the provision itself exists is
increased.
2. Standardized Solutions In The Law
Many of the standardized solutions are found in the law itself.
There is much more statutory contract law applicable to complex
transactions in Germany than in the United States. 69 And, because
Germany is a civil law system with only one jurisdiction at issue, the
law is generally quite uniform.7" There are also detailed commentaries
that are generally regarded as authoritative sources of law.71
Most of the German statutory provisions applicable to contracts
are in the German Law of Obligations, which is part of the German
Civil Code (BGB).72 The Law of Obligations has a chapter containing
rules relevant to all obligations, including contractual obligations.
73
69. There is considerable variation within the United States in this respect. More code-
oriented states, such as Louisiana, California, and a number of the Western states, have a statu-
tory law of obligations that contains "comprehensive" general rules on the law of contracts.
New York, on the other hand, has a General Obligations Law that only governs particular issues
in contract law. A number of other states rely principally on common law and only govern
particular types of contracts by statute. But even the most detailed of the U.S. codes, such as the
California Civil Code, is much less comprehensive in its detailed rules on contract law than the
German BGB and HGB.
70. Dreier-Stettner, Grundgesetz Kommentar, Art. 74 Rn 15 GG.
71. The commentary regarded as the most authoritative on the German Civil Code (the
BGB) is probably PALANDT, which is in its sixty-third edition (2004). The commentary is com-
monly available in German law offices and law libraries; almost all German law students own
their own copies.
72. Book 2, §§ 241-853 BGB.
73. §§ 241-304 BGB. Note that the concept of a contract (German: Vertrag) is generally
broader than the American concept and includes such matters as gifts and transfers of property
(for example, the transfer of real property in satisfaction of an obligation to transfer the prop-
erty, say, under a court order). There are a few other legal relationships other than tort and
contract to which the law of obligations applies, such as restitution (§§ 812-822 BGB) and
Geschiftsfiihrung ohne Atuftrag (§§ 677-687 BGB), a legal concept with no clear U.S. counter-
part covering some cases in which U.S. law would cover by implied contracts, others covered by
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These include rules on interpretation, performance, and default.
Compared with the United States, there are many more rules for
filling contractual gaps. In the United States, many of the formal gap-
filling rules are in Article 2 of the UCC, which applies only to sales of
goods and does not encompass most complex business transactions.
In both the U.S. and Germany, gap-filling rules are often in the form
of "standards" specifying, for instance, "reasonable" quality, quantity
or notice.
Some German contract law is in the form of definitions or elabo-
rations of standard legal terms and concepts, typically as default or
optional provisions that parties may, and not infrequently do, adopt.
Concepts defined or elucidated in the German statute include sub-
stantial performance, allocation of risk of mistake, and cure rights. In
U.S. law, these concepts are extensively addressed, but in Germany,
there is a detailed and uniform elaboration in the statute and com-
mentaries. German statutes also specify when a time period for notice
starts,74 (including notice of default),71 when the period ends,76 and the
number of days to be counted in a month or year (e.g., for calculating
interest),77 and define business days,7" affiliate,79 related person,8 o real
property,81 and many other commonly used terms. In the U.S., parties
typically would not have available either a common-law or statutory
definition that could be readily incorporated. German law also con-
siderably shortens the contractual space needed to address a common
problem: the authority of a document's signatory to bind the entity
she purports to be binding. 2 In the lengthier U.S. solution, authority
unjust enrichment or constructive trusts, and others in which there would be no cause of action
in the United States.
74. The day on which the notice is given does not count for the period. § 187 BGB.
75. § 286 BGB; § 377 HGB.
76. § 188 BGB specifies when a notice period ends depending on how it is phrased (in days,
months, etc.). For example, Paragraph (German: Absatz) 2 explains that if the contract dated
May 15 says "in six months" this is presumed to mean the end of the sixth full month, i.e.,
November 30, not November 15. A term saying "six weeks" would mean the end of the sixth full
week, which might be more than 52 days, if the starting day is in the middle of a week.
77. § 191 BGB.
78. § 193 BGB.
79. § 15 Aktiengesetz. v. 6.9.1965 (BGBI. I S.1089), translated in GERMAN STOCK
CORPORATION ACT 37 (Friedrich K. Juenger & Lajos Schmidt trans., 1967).
80. § 15 Abgabenordnung (AO) [Tax Code].
81. §§ 94-98 BGB § 3 Grundbuchordnung [Land Registration Act], v. 24.3.1897 (RGBI.
S.139), available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/gbo/index.html.
82. The combination of the personal liability of the signatory without authority under § 179
BGB, German doctrines of apparent authority, and, most importantly, the protection of reliance
on entries in the Commercial Register in § 15 HGB obviate in practice the need for secretaries'
and incumbency certificates as well as warranties of authority in German transactions.
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is typically vouched for using several warranties and certificates; the
language of the warranties and certificates may be a subject for nego-
tiation.
The German statutes also provide default remedies provisions.,3
The provisions are more often contracted around than many other
default provisions; they are, however, available for adoption and
many parties do adopt them. German law also is more apt than U.S.
law to respect parties' specification of an amount as liquidated dam-
ages. 4 In the United States, liquidated damages may very well be
invalidated as unenforceable "penalties;" parties have to draft their
damages provisions carefully to minimize the chance of invalidation, 5
and have to take into account the possibility that despite their efforts,
their specification of amount will not be respected.
Germany also has laws applicable to particular types of contracts,
such as purchase agreements, loans, and rental of chattels or real
estate. 6 There is also a set of rules for construction contracts, Verdin-
83. Specific performance is nominally the primary remedy, although several scholars have
noted that in most cases, damages are the remedy sought and awarded. See B.S. MARKENSIS, W.
LORENZ, G. DANNEMANN, THE GERMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, VOLUME 1: THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS AND RESTITUTION: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCrION 30 (1997); see also Henrik
Lando & Caspar Rose, The Myth of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries (LEFIC
Working Paper No. 2003-14, Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.cbs.dk/
lefic/Working%20papers/2003/wplefic142003new.pdf. Lando and Rose argue that "specific
performance has become irrelevant for action breaches due to the extra costs and difficulties it
entails at the stage of final execution when the breaching party must be coerced into performing
certain actions."
84. While § 343 BGB allows an obligor to seek a judgment reforming a contract to reduce a
contractual penalty that is unreasonably high, § 348 HGB does not permit such a reduction for
commercial parties except where the amount is "unconscionably high," a threshold that is very
hard to meet in commercial cases. Palandt/ Heinrichs, supra note 63, at Rn. 9 zu § 343 BGB.
85. As we mention in the text accompanying note 104, infra, Lundmark, supra note l1, also
makes this observation. Other common-law doctrines also may require extensive drafting,
either to assure or rebut the application of thereof: examples include covenants not to compete
and guarantees. This being said, contract law seems to dictate the contents of contracts far more
in Germany than it does in the U.S.: In the U.S., because contracts are so customized and be-
cause there is comparatively less contract law, there is very often no applicable statute or com-
mon law for parties to adopt or contract around. We discuss this matter in Section I.D, infra.
86. The sections in the BGB on purchase agreements have very broad application; they
apply not only to the sale of goods, but also to intangibles such as shares in a privately held
company. § 453 BGB. See Palandt / Putzo, at Rn. 7 zu § 453 BGB, Wolfgang Wertnauer, Der
Unternehmenskauf nach neuem Kaufrecht, NJW 2000, 2511, 2513. The BG B also provides spe-
cific rules for specialized types of contracts. One example is Pacht, a form of contract used to
lease an entire business or a property such as a hotel or restaurant that includes furnishings and
equipment. §§ 581-597 BGB. Other types of contracts (so-called "Inominatvertridge") are not
expressly covered by the BGB but are still subject to general rules in the BGB and other Ger-
man statutes; other rules for other types of specialized contracts also may apply by analogy. One
example is franchising or link agreements between Internet providers.
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gungsordnung fiir Bauleistungen (VOB).7 VOB is chosen by the
majority of builders and construction companies for at least some of
their work.88 Again, the U.S. has far less statutory law dealing with
these areas than does Germany, and certainly, no real analogue to
Germany's detailed authoritative commentaries, even in caselaw.
3. Other Standardized Solutions
While most of the solutions are to be found in the law itself,
there are also more standardized "private" solutions in Germany than
in the United States. Perhaps most importantly, standardized solu-
tions can be found in forms in common use prepared by trade associa-
tions. Trade associations are far more important in Germany than
they are in the United States.
Under German law, the provisions in some trade association and
certain other forms can be incorporated by reference. 9 Thus, for in-
stance, loan documents can be quite short because they can incorpo-
rate by reference the general terms set forth in the General Terms
and Conditions of Banks, a standard form.90 While parties do not al-
ways use trade association forms, they do so often; the forms' exis-
tence clearly contributes to greater standardization of contract
provisions overall. Furthermore, law firms are more apt to publish
form documents than in the United States, and these are more apt to
be broadly used;91 by contrast, in the United States, each transactional
law firm, and, often, many subgroups of lawyers within a law firm, has
its own form.
87. The VOB has many schedules and provisions relating to different types of construction
work as well as standards for performance. The VOB is mandatory for most government pro-
curement of such services when the amount contracted exceeds E5 million. § 7 Verordnung Ober
die Vergabe Offentlicher Auftrige.
88. Most builders and construction companies choose the VOB-B, which is the part of the
VOB dealing with performance. Indeed, it is increasingly being argued that the VOB-B should
be treated as a custom of the trade, applicable unless the parties expressly contract out of it.
89. § 305 (2) and (3) BGB.
90. See. e.g., Peter Builow, Heidelberger Kommentar zum WechselG / ScheckG / AGB
(2000).
91. We note in Part II.C.5 below that law firm competition in the U.S. includes competition
on "forms," whereas German law firm competition is far less "form-driven." Interestingly, an
organization of in-house lawyers in England is attempting to obtain from law firms and post on
the web for their members forms for various types of transactions. See Rachel Rothwell,
In-House Lawyers Ask Firms To Give Out Precedents, LAW SOCIETY GAZETTE, Nov. 20, 2003.
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4. Discussion and Analysis
German contract law, complemented by trade association forms
and law firm forms, helps German contracts contain fewer words than
U.S. contracts. The mandatory and default provisions in German con-
tract law are applicable without the need for any reference thereto in
the contract. And for provisions in the law that require express adop-
tion, the task can be accomplished by the use of comparatively few
words. For example, Section 463 of the BGB provides a statutory
procedure for a right of first refusal. If the parties are satisfied with
the statutory procedure, then only one sentence is necessary ("A
grants B a right of first refusal in respect of the share in X Co."); the
parties needn't then specify how the right of first refusal operates. If
the parties want to change just one aspect-for instance, the price is
to be fixed instead of being based on the price offered by the third
party-then only the changed terms need be included. It also tends to
take very few words to contract around default provisions should the
parties choose to do so; that being said, however, the need to contract
around a provision may yield more words than would have been the
case had the default provision not been in the law.
Adoption of the trade association and law firm forms is of course
optional. All or part of the trade association forms can often be
adopted with only a brief reference, as noted above. Adoption of the
law firms' forms in toto is straightforward as well, and the forms
themselves are shorter, as we note in Part I.A.92 The net effect is that
German contracts are on balance shorter.93
The harder and more interesting question is whether and how
the existence of all these mandatory, optional, and default provisions
help German contracts do as much with fewer words-in other words,
whether the reduction in length is achieved without much sacrifice to
parties' ability to obtain (or at least specify) precisely the deal they
want. The mandatory provisions on their face would seem to limit
parties from getting the deal they want. The default provisions might
seem to have the same effect to the extent that contracting around
them was costly. Indeed, more broadly, the ready availability of stan-
92. Indeed, the German forms resemble "true" fill-in-the-blanks forms far more than do
U.S. "forms." The U.S. "forms" are precedents used in an earlier transaction, itself the product
of cumulation as discussed above.
93. It helps, too, that there are simply fewer synonyms in German than in English, thanks
to English having both French and German roots. Many of the "pairs" in U.S. drafting are the
Norman French and Germanic synonyms, e.g., "null and void," "cease and desist," "fit and
proper," etc.
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dardized solutions, in law or in forms commonly used in practice, may
make parties adopt those solutions because contracting around them
(or not adopting the optional but commonly used provision included
in a form) is costly; had the parties not had to incur those costs, they
might have adopted something that suited them both better.14 More-
over, in an agency cost dynamic, a German lawyer might compromise
on some specifics that her client might have wanted lest she be
thought of as overly aggressive.
But the limitation on parties' ability to get or specify the deal
they want is small relative to the benefit. And the limitation is rather
small in any event. There are very few mandatory provisions, and
parties can choose whether they want to be bound by the default or
optional provisions. And it's generally not difficult to contract around
the default provisions. But, more importantly, the benefit is consider-
able, consisting of the transaction cost savings of using the readily and
cheaply available provisions in the laws rather than elaborately
custom tailored provisions. Our argument is that the laws' provisions,
supplemented by provisions in trade association forms and the forms
commonly published by German law firms,95 are mostly "good
enough;" in many cases, custom tailoring modifying those provisions
costs more than it is worth.96
The benefits of having standardized provisions for boilerplate
and like concepts (such as the definition of "business day") should be
obvious. But we think that for many provisions, cheap "good enough"
solutions can be preferable to much more expensive custom tailored
provisions. As we discuss below, adoption of the standardized solu-
tion (a) should save transaction costs at the contract formation stage;
(b) shouldn't prevent the parties from conducting their relationship as
they please when they are getting along; and (c) perhaps counterintui-
94. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 548, note that contracting around inefficient defaults
raises parties' transaction costs.
95. We do acknowledge, though, that at a certain point, a plethora of standardized solu-
tions can scarcely be characterized as "standardized." Most of the solutions are standardized-
there are many solutions, but to different problems; consider the trade association forms. Solu-
tions that compete with one another are the trickier case, but thus far, the norm to stop sooner
seems to have swamped the "battle of the boilerplate" that not infrequently occurs in U.S.
negotiations.
96. See Scott, supra note 5, at 93, discussing when it will be appropriate for the state to
write default rules. We largely agree with the spirit of Scott's analysis, but because we think that
parties purportedly "free" to choose their own terms are, at least in the United States, hobbled
by a path-dependent and agency-cost-ridden trajectory into customizing their agreements far
more than is needed to achieve their aims, we are more apt to think that particular state-
supplied default rules will be worthwhile.
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tively, might yield no greater interpretive error than would a more
customized provision.
It is helpful for our analysis to distinguish between three periods:
when the parties are establishing their relationship, when they are
maintaining their relationship, and during any end-game in which
they may find themselves if their relationship sours. Relative to U.S.
contracting, German contracting should minimize the sum of rela-
tionship establishment costs, relationship maintenance costs and end-
game costs.
It is easy to see how German contracting minimizes costs of
establishing the parties' relationship. The main component of such
costs is sometimes referred to in the literature as "specification
costs."9 7 These costs are clearly lower in Germany, given the stan-
dardized mandatory, default and optional provisions (and, of course,
relatedly, the norm of "stopping sooner"). But there are also other
relationship establishment costs; indeed, Hill has argued98 that a sig-
nificant function of U.S. contract negotiation is for the parties to find
out what they want from the transaction and from one another. Nego-
tiations conducted pursuant to the customization norm may yield a
great deal of such information. However, given the considerable ex-
pense of customization, the value of this information is probably
smaller than the associated cost. Moreover, customizing the words in
a contract is only one way to get information about one's prospective
contracting partner and the transaction both parties contemplate; it
isn't the only way. There is no reason to suppose German parties
wouldn't conduct negotiations or discussions until they were satisfied
that they had the information they needed about the relationship they
sought to establish.
Relationship maintenance costs ought to be the same, since these
don't much turn on what's in the contract. But perhaps the threat to
initiate litigation based on a particular provision in the contract helps
keep parties in line; more customized contracts might reduce relation-
ship maintenance costs because a more specific threat to litigate could
be more forcefully made. We think, though, that this reduction is
lower than the reduction in specification costs from less customized
contracts. We think, too, that in the U.S., the increment by which a
97. See, e. g., Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense Of The Incorporation Strategy, in
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Jody S.
Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
98. See Language and Norms, supra note 22, and accompanying text.
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threat to litigate would motivate more conciliatory behavior wouldn't
be much increased on account of a provision's being customized; it's
the threat of litigation itself that probably has most of the in terrorem
effect.
End game costs-a significant component of which is sometimes
referred to in the literature as "interpretive error" 99- should present
the major difficulty: after all, what parties gain in not having specified
more thoroughly in the first instance they should lose when asking a
court to enforce their contract, since the court is apt to make more
errors with a less customized contract. The very large savings in speci-
fication costs probably exceeds the cost of even fairly large interpre-
tive errors, especially since the likelihood of litigation is fairly low
(and in any event far less than one). But a more ambitious claim
might be warranted: interpretive error costs themselves might be
lower in Germany. Our arguments in this subsection are bolstered by
our view that German judges' qualifications and experience make
them better suited to contract litigation, but they still hold, albeit with
less force, even if the judges are no better than U.S. judges.
Our argument is this: Parties to complex contracts in the U.S.
can't readily get the benefits of their careful drafting should they go
to court. They seek to capture every possible increment of precision;
the resultant provisions will often be complex, hard to interpret, and,
in spite of the parties' best efforts, susceptible of one or more strate-
gic misinterpretations. Moreover, the more customized the provision,
the less likely that it has been interpreted in a prior case; even if there
has been a prior interpretation of a comparable provision, the provi-
sion may be sufficiently different that the interpretation can be ar-
gued not to apply. And the more complex and singular the provision,
as customized provisions are apt to be, the more costly the litigation,
all else equal.
German parties, by contrast, are more likely to be using stan-
dardized provisions. Thus, the provisions to be interpreted in a par-
ticular case may very well have been interpreted before, including in
detailed commentaries. We cannot make too much of this point, how-
ever: if the provision's interpretation and application were completely
clear, parties presumably would not be in litigation. But even custom-
ized provisions, such as the more transaction-specific provisions, will
probably be easier to interpret than U.S. customized provisions, and
99. Id.
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be less amenable to misinterpretation, whether strategic or benign,
for all the reasons we have discussed, most notably that that customi-
zation in Germany stops sooner and doesn't cumulate from form to
form, that a general statement suffices without a litany of examples,
that standard definitions and concepts are available for adoption even
in customized provisions, and that various features of the German
language make for clearer referents. "I0
In sum, when German parties adopt "good enough" provisions,
they are not specifying "exactly what they want." But agreement on a
customized provision isn't that reliable a way to get "exactly what one
wants" in court."0 t. Especially given that litigation may never arise, but
100. Commercially expert German judges may also be better at determining words' ordinary
meaning, as opposed to a (that is, any) meaning countenanced by the dictionary, the "plain"
meaning. This distinction is discussed in Lawrence M. Solan, Ordinary Meaning and Legal
Interpretation, forthcoming, conference proceedings of the Italian-American Congress of Com-
parative Law: Ordinary Language and Legal Language in Public and Private Law (Guiffr6
2004).
101. Another point should be made. There is some indication that German courts may
respect parties' choice of interpretive convention more than do U.S. courts. The contract litera-
ture distinguishes between textual or formalist conventions of interpretation, and "contextual"
conventions of interpretation on the other. Textual or formalist conventions look more at the
words of the contract, and in particular, the "plain meaning" of the words. Contextual conven-
tions look at parol and other extrinsic evidence, notably course of performance of the contract
at issue, course of dealing of these parties in other contracts with one another, and usage of
trade and custom. There is an extensive literature debating which mode is preferable. See gener-
ally Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004); Paul G. Mahoney, Goetz & Scott: The Collaboration That Trans-
formed Contract Law, 6 VA. J. 12 (2003); Charles J. Goctz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of
Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions between Express and Implied Contract Terms,
73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6; Bernstein, Creating Cooperation,
supra note 29. The literature considers whether parties would want formalistic or contextual
modes of interpretation, whether one or the other should be the default mode of interpretation
in all or particular cases, whether purely formalistic interpretation is possible or whether all
interpretation is at base somewhat contextual, and so on. (Hill takes no position on this debate,
except to agree that "pure" formalism is surely a fiction; King is persuaded by Katz's argument
that for some types of contracts, such as contracts between parties who "engage in many similar
transactions or do business together regularly," the default rule ought to be textual interpreta-
tion, but that in various other types of contracts, the default rule ought to be contextual inter-
pretation. See Katz, supra, at 528.)
Even if German courts don't respect parties' choice more, there's no indication that
they would respect it less. And there's certainly no reason to suppose German judges would
apply an interpretive convention in a more error-ridden manner than would a U.S. judge; in
fact, we might conclude the contrary if we believe German judges are smart and commercially
savvy.
Even if German parties' specification were respected less, the results might neverthe-
less be more certain and predictable than results in U.S. litigation. There are two possibilities.
Either the specification is of a contextual convention and a textual convention is applied, or the
specification is of a textual convention and a contextual convention is applied. Since the results
of the textual convention are predictable in most cases, such a result should be within the
contemplation of the parties even if it is not their desired result. If the parties want a textual
convention and instead get a contextual convention, even then the results might be superior to
those in the U.S. Because there is more homogeneity among transacting sub-communities (that
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contract drafting and negotiation are certain, customizing a provision
when a "good enough" cheaply available alternative exists may not be
cost-effective.
5. Standardization in the U.S.?
If standardized solutions are so advantageous, why can't they be
achieved in the United States? One reason is presumably that in
Germany almost all civil law is federal, 02 whereas the United States
has fifty state statutes as well as the common law. As is well known,
even "uniform" laws aren't always enacted or interpreted uniformly.
But why can't the solutions be achieved privately? Certainly, private
standardized solutions are achieved in Germany with trade associa-
tion forms. But there may be less activity to this end in the United
States; U.S. trade associations' efforts to standardize contracts might
be suspect under the antitrust laws. 03
Germany's comparatively more homogeneous and repeat trans-
actional community (and different antitrust laws) may not only per-
mit the development of more trade associations, but may also
maximize the number of provisions as to which standardization is
advantageous; comparatively stronger extra-legal forces can allow for
the development and enforcement of relational norms that effectively
modify the standardized provisions in day-to-day business activity.
There is also a strong path-dependence story: once lawyers compete
by touting their forms, they will be hard pressed to support much
standardization. Indeed, U.S. law firms compete by touting the com-
prehensiveness of their forms, as well as the contract that is drafted
and negotiated on the basis on those forms: the forms "cover every-
thing" and the firms' lawyers think of, and argue for, "everything" as
is, "trades") in which transactions typically occur, custom and usage of trade, key components of
the contextual inquiry, should be more readily and more certainly determined. (Of course,
should the German transacting community become more heterogeneous, custom and usage of
trade should become harder to determine.) German parties should thus be able to narrow the
universe of possible outcomes appreciably, and should be able to exclude many particularly
problematic possibilities.
102. Although the German Basic Law in Art. 74 Abs. I Nr. I GG permits the Lander to
legislate in the area of civil law to the extent not preempted by federal legislation, the area of
the law of contracts and commercial law has been all but completely preempted by federal
legislation. In fact, the only legislation of the Linder that bears on this Article would be the
implementing legislation of the individual Lander setting up panels for commercial disputes,
since the lower courts are courts of the Lander.
103. See, e.g., Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1157-59
(5th Cir. 1992) (agreement of forms for arbitration in the securities industry was thought to be a
conspiracy in violation of Section I of the Sherman Act).
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well. By contrast, competition among law firms in Germany has ap-
parently been far less form-driven. German lawyers not infrequently
publish their forms; competing on the basis of having the better form
is difficult when others can readily use the form.
104
And certainly, a lawyer or law firm is hard pressed (and ill ad-
vised) to tout his firm's willingness to "lay down its arms" when oth-
ers are not doing so as well. Collective action problems also might
prevent clients from getting together to try to force standardization.
And it's not obvious who standardization's other effective and moti-
vated proponents would be. For all these reasons, standardized solu-
tions may have been easier or more worthwhile to develop in
Germany than in the United States.105 We think U.S. contracting
parties would benefit from more of such solutions but we think that
the various dynamics we have outlined may make it unlikely that
many will be developed.
0 6
D. The Literature
We are not the first to consider why German contracts are
shorter than U.S. contracts. Other scholars have proposed various
answers, including the following: Georges Van Hecke, a German
lawyer, points to the "perfectionism" of U.S. lawyers, the fact that a
contract may be litigated in, and under the laws of, several different
states, as well as the relative uncertainty of the common law. 107 John
H. Langbein, an American law professor, points to what he views as
the superior system of civil procedure in Germany, with smarter and
104. Claims have been successfully made in England for copyright violations for using
clauses from a law firm's forms. See Victoria MacCallum, Legal Documents Bound By Rules of
Copyright, L. GAZETTIE (London), May 12, 2002, available at http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/. Such
claims are unknown in Germany. Interestingly, as discussed in supra, note 91, English in-house
lawyers are trying to persuade English law firms to post precedents (that is, forms) on the in-
house lawyers' website.
105. It will be interesting to see the results of the European Community initiative discussed
in supra, note 3, to develop standardized contract provisions.
106. Indeed, it would be interesting to see what effect the existence of U.C.C. Article 2 has
on the length of contracts. Interesting-but perhaps impossible in principle to measure. One
might think that for lawyers who do commercial law generally and don't specialize in U.CC.
Article 2 contracts, their general habits and familiarities would trump the effect we're describ-
ing. In any event, they might very well be facing a lawyer who didn't "stop sooner," making it
unlikely that they would. A good test could be the contract drafted and negotiated by two law-
yers who both focused their practices on U.C.C. Article 2. Contracts among trade association
members would be of interest as well, but less so than might initially appear if the trade at issue
is a simple commodity, and all the possible problems and solutions involving transactions in the
commodity are known.
107. Van Hecke, supra note 18, at 10-12.
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more expert judges having control of fact-finding and having consid-
erable ability to limit strategic behavior by the parties. 08 Graf von
Westphalen, a name partner in a large and prominent German law
firm and the author of a leading treatise in contract law, points to the
fact that under German law, obligations of good faith are stronger,
hence limiting parties' need to specify and constrain particular behav-
ior that a general obligation to act in good faith encompasses. Graf
von Westphalen also notes that German law contains many more
general terms that the parties can easily adopt with a few words. 09
Thomas Lundmark, an American-born German law professor, points
to a general U.S. distrust of judges and the legal system coupled with
a strong devotion to the idea of freedom of contract. 10 He also notes
that the U.S. law restricting contractual "penalties" may contribute to
longer U.S. contracts, as parties struggle to couch their remedies in a
manner that won't be deemed a penalty."' Lundmark believes, too,
that because of growing distrust of the legal system in Germany, it is
more likely that German contracts will come to resemble U.S. con-
tracts than that U.S. contracts could come to resemble German con-
tracts." 2 We deal with each of these points below.
As we have explained, we agree that the relative clarity of the
substantive law, the availability of easy-to-adopt general terms, and
the relative superiority of German civil procedure for this type of
litigation play an important role. In particular, we partly agree with
the spirit of Langbein's views: the "German advantage" in civil pro-
cedure means that parties don't need to worry as much about strate-
gic misinterpretations of contracts being advanced, and therefore,
don't need to spend time and effort thinking through all possible
interpretations and clarifying which one is intended. But we think
that the United States' comparatively messier judicial system is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient to explain its longer contracts. One of us
has argued that U.S. contracts are rationally and deliberately not writ-
ten in a manner that lends itself to easy interpretation and enforce-
ment by a judge. For various reasons, including path-dependence, the
contracts are quite complex, and nobody has the incentive to "clean
them up;""' 3 this fact is used by the parties as a bond that they will
108. Langbein, The German Advaniage supra note 35.
109. Von Westphalen, supra note 14.
110. Lundmark, supra note 1, at 130-31.
Ill. Id. at 123-24.
112. Id. at 131.
113. Hill, Legalese, supra note 7, at 69, 75-81.
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attempt to resolve disputes through extra-legal means such as nego-
tiation rather than going readily to court. Distrust of the legal system
thus may influence the length of contracts, but perhaps not quite in as
direct or important a way as Lundmark may be thinking it does.
Moreover, a contract's ability to bind the parties thereto under law is
only a small part of its function.
We are a bit skeptical about the importance of fifty different
states' laws,114 and the need to rebut particular common law doctrines.
In our experience, many of the types of provisions that are longest in
U.S. contracts are the ones as to which the law will typically honor
what the parties agree upon, and there is no applicable common-law
precedent. We agree that being able to simply set forth a contractual
penalty and not worry much that it be deemed unenforceable might
make for shorter contracts, but again, in our experience, these types
of provisions aren't where the real heft of contracts is to be found. We
find plausible the idea that less needs to be specified in German con-
tracts because of the residual obligations of good faith and related
provisions in the statute, but for reasons discussed above, we don't
necessarily feel that these fewer words help German contracts do as
much as U.S. contracts, since we feel that German parties may to
some extent be holding themselves and each other to a higher stan-
dard of conduct than they would agree to if left to contract freely, and
may be subjecting themselves to inefficient uncertainty.
We are sympathetic to the idea that U.S. parties may resist more
law in the form of mandatory and even default provisions because of
a greater attachment to the idea of freedom of contract; that being
said, we note that U.S. parties could achieve some more standardiza-
tion through private solutions such as trade associations and generally
do not.115 In any event, once law firm competition on forms is under-
way, having more law probably won't help unless it is mandatory. In
this regard, consider that German cross-border transactions, including
114. Interestingly, a closely analogous argument is made by practitioners in Europe doing
cross-border transactions: that the parties need customized contracts that virtually "stand alone"
from statutory law of any particular jurisdiction, so the parties understand equally well what
their contract says. We think it's plausible (indeed, King thinks it is likely) that lawyers might
advance this argument more strongly than the reality warrants. A lawyer might do so sincerely,
or might do so opportunistically, seeking to carve out a larger and more lucrative role for her
services. It is interesting in this regard that, as discussed in supra, note 3, the European commu-
nity is studying the development of standardized terms for contracts among Europeans.
115. We don't want to overstate the case here. There are some standardized forms in the
United States; one notable example is the form used by the International Swap Dealers' Asso-
ciation. See id. at 59 n.2. Furthermore, as we discuss in supra, note 96 and accompanying text,
U.S. antitrust concerns may discourage the formation of trade associations in the United States.
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those governed by German law, are increasingly using the Anglo-
American model and not accepting, or at least modifying signifi-





Finally, we are sympathetic to the characterization of U.S. law-
yers as "perfectionists" insofar as they strive for ever-increasing
increments of precision; we have, of course, argued throughout this
Article that this "practice" does not make "perfect."
In sum, in our view, some of the explanations in the literature are
partially right, some are partially wrong, and none is wholly right. In
particular, the explanations give both too much and too little of a role
to law, don't give enough of a role to reputation and norms, and don't
give the right sort of role to lawyers.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have explained how German contracts can do
as much as U.S. contracts with fewer words. In Germany, legal and
extra-legal forces combine to make the costs of "stopping sooner" in
the contracting process lower than they are in the United States. Par-
ties in both countries will contract until the costs exceed the benefits;
that point has come sooner in Germany than it has in the United
States, for reasons we explain.
But we are then left to explain a notable trend: starting in cross-
border transactions, and increasingly, in purely domestic transactions
within Germany, Anglo-American style contracting, with its addi-
tional words is becoming more common.
We have two explanations. One is more charitable to the Anglo-
American style of contracting: that the manner in which German
contracting constrains opportunism requires considerable homogene-
ity and extensive repeat interactions among transacting partners;
without such homogeneity and repeat interactions, recourse to courts
will become more important, because it is harder to agree upon, po-
lice, and enforce norms in a more heterogeneous community. With
looser reputational ties, accepting standardized provisions may be-
come less advisable since a scheme in which the standardized provi-
sions are mostly "for the court" and the parties develop their own
more flexible norms to govern their relationship when they are get-
116. But see supra, notes 3 and 98, regarding the European Community initiative to create
standardized contract terms.
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ting along, as has been described in the literature by Lisa Bernstein, 17
will be harder to develop and enforce. Moreover, the protracted ne-
gotiations involved in elaborate customization may be more useful for
parties coming to know each other for the first time who do not
expect to become part of a very repeat reputational community: con-
sider, for example, the situation of a private equity fund making
acquisitions in various industries in different countries.
But we also propose a different and less charitable explanation.
Once enough people who do not subscribe to the stopping sooner
norm enter the community, the norm becomes quite hard to sustain.
The norm only makes sense if both sides will abide by it; if the other
side is going to argue for a customized provision, the savings to "just
saying no" are likely to be limited, and a lawyer will rationally try to
make the best of the situation and argue for her client's desired cus-
tomized provision. Perhaps U.S. style form-oriented competition
among German law firms is next.
In sum, differences in German law and civil procedure may not
suffice to keep the stopping sooner norm intact. While some dilution
was probably inevitable as markets became more globalized, some of
the dilution may be attributable to a trajectory in which expensive
increments of precision must be purchased to keep up with an arms
race.
117. Bernstein, Creating Cooperation, supra note 29.
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